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1. Introduction
With the recent upheavals in the Middle East, rising oil prices, and fears
surrounding global climate change on many people ' s minds, energy and where it
comes from , is becoming an increasingly important economic and environmental
issue. Energy is a buzzword on the lips of politicians and the public alike, as solutions
are sought to what may be the ncxt energy clisis as a growing population requires
more energy to support itsel f.
The world population is expected to grow by 50 % in the 21 SI century, and
energy consumption is expected to grow 300 % making finding a sustainable source
of energy extremely important (Hecht & Miller 20 I 0). CUITently, most of the world
relies on fossil fuels such as petroleum crude oils and coal ; these fuels are energy
dense and easy to store and transport, which accounts for the popularity of their use
(Klass 2003). However, by their definition , these fuels are also finite, especially when
it comes to crude oil (Klass 2003). The supply of oil is rapidly reaching peak
production, after which prices will rise making the use of oilundcsirable (Klass 2003).

Improvements in energy efficiency may temporarily postpone the combined
effect of growing world demand for energy and a dwindling supply (Klass 2003). The
McKinsey report on energy efficiency estimates that with full implementation of
currently available technologies energy consumption in the United States alone could
be cut by 23 % saving more than $1.2 trillion (Granade et.a!. 2009). However,
misconceptions about energy savings, and difficulties achicving the behavior changes
that would be required for people to adopt energy saving habits makes

•
implementation difficult at best (Attari et.a\. 20 I 0 and Di etz et.a\. 2009). The
development of new, commercially viab le, fuel sources to repl ace what will soon
become a fuel source too expensive for the market is needed in conjunction with
increased efficiency (Klass 2003).
One of the solutions being considered is that of alternative or renewabl e
energy. The telms, alternative energy and renewable energy, are often used
interchangeabl y, in that they refer to energy production methods that do not use up
natural resources or otherwise harm the environment. For the purpose of this paper,
the two terms will also be used interchangeably. Under the standard definition,
alternative energies are those that do not u se fossil fuels or nuclear power. This
includes wind and solar energies, modern biomass (including the use of biomass to
produce other, more traditional fuels , such as methane), wave and tidal stream
energies, and geothenllal energy (Gross et.a\. 2003). These different types of energy
are all in various stages of development and have differing degrees of commercial
viability, with some already viable while others will require a substantial amount of
research before they reach a point where they can compete in the market (Gross et.a\.
2003).
This paper will examine the types of alternative energies that are available at
this point, focus on the formation of markets for alternative energy and discuss how
new energy technology enters and then diffuses into the markets. Along with energy
technology diffusion , this paper will examine how policy structures make technology
diffusion possible and which types of policy are most effective. To answer this
question, the report uses Germany and the United States as case studies. From the
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case studies, we will be able to draw some conclusions about what makes some
policies more successful than others, and make recommendations on how best to
structure effective alternative energy policy. The paper argues that to achieve growth
in the alternative energy sector requires policies that work to create market
opportunities for alternative energies and that by doing so such policies will create an
energy system where alternative energies become established.

II. Alternative Energies

In this section, I discuss several different forms of energy production,
detailing aspects of technological development , geographies of resource availability,
and social-political and economic dimensions. Each of these energy sources and
forms of production are advocated as ways to replace contemporary fossil-fuel based
sources. They are, to differing degrees, the targets of energy policy in numerous
countries as well as state governments around the world.
Wind

Wind power is one of the most talked about alternative energies. It is also the
greatest success story with regards to market growth and the most commercially
viable of the available options (Gross et.a!. 2003). Wind power is emission free power
that is captured by wind turbines (DOE:EERE 20 I 0 "Wind and water"). Electricity
1h

was first generated by wind in the 19 century, but it wasn't until the 1950s that the
first modem wind turbine was built in Denmark (Gross et.a!' 2003). The turbines
went into commercial application in the I 980s, becoming progressively larger until
they reached the current commercial models (Gross et.a!' 2003).
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Innovation in the wind power sector is immense. From the late 1980s to 2003
energy output has increased I OO-fold, and the capacity of commercial turbines has
increased from SSkW to I MW or more (Gross et.al. 2003). The level of sound
produced by the turbines was also halved in a t1u·ee year period leading up to 2003,
while the weight of the turbines per kW was halved in a five year period, lowering
manufacturing and shipping costs (Gross et.al. 2003). There is also a movement for
wind production to move off-shore, where there is a potential for an even larger and
more stable supply of energy (pieper 2009).

Wind energy is the one renewable energy that is cons istentl y pushed for by
most countries, since it is a ready domestic source of energy in many areas. At the
windiest sites, wind farms are already close to being cost competitive with
conventional power (Gross et.al. 2003). In the US alone there is the potential for up to
10,000,000MW of land-based wind power, enough to power the whole nation several
times over (DOE:EERE 2010 "Wind .. "). However, care must be taken in properly
siting wind turbines and fan11S in areas that receive enough wind to keep the turbines
running. Currently wind power in sites with good to moderate wind sells for about 46¢IkWh, and is projected to fall to about 3¢IkWh (Gross et.al. 2003).

While general public support for wind energy is very high, when it comes to
siting wind farms, it is not unusual 10 encounter instances of"NIMBYism."
1MBYism refers to the " not in my backyard" attitude people or entire communities
often take concerning new construction of so-called "locally unwanted land-uses"
(LULUs), whether it is a new prison, nuclear power plant, or a wind farm (DevineWright 2005). With wind farms the reasons that are most often cited are the visual
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impact that wind turbines have on the landscape and the noise that is produced by the
turbines (Devine-Wright 2005). Less often people's complaints stem from a
perception that the wind turbines are unreliable or less efficient than coal-fired power
plants, or the impact on birds and wildlife (Devine-Wright 2005). Typically, even
when there are objections to a project, support for constmction tends to remain
positive (Wustenhagen et.al. 2007). In fact , research demonstrates that renewable
energies tend to follow a U-curve when it comes to community acceptance, with the
siting process being the lowest point of the curve; before the project is sited and after
a project is up and mnning, pub.lic support for renewable projects tends to be high
(Wiistenhagen et.al. 2007).

Solar
Solar, like wind, is an energy source that has seen great improvement in
technological advancement, acceptance and market expansion over the last few years.
Solar energy can be harnessed in both passive and active ways (Pieper 2009). Passive
solar refers to the capture of solar energy directly to provide heat or hot water, while
active solar captures energy and converts it to electricity through the usc of
Photovoltaic cells (BMU 2008). Photovoltaics, however, remain expensive, with the
power produced from them at 6-10 times the cost of grid electricity, mostly as a result
of material and production costs (Gross et.al. 2003).

Photovoltaics were first used in the 1960s to power satellites, with their uses
expanding to fill small niches in the market such as powering calculators and smallseale telecommunications (Gross et.al. 2003). Most commercial photovoltaics are
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made of individual crystalline silicone cells, which require sophi sticated techniques to
manufacture, and are therefore inherently high cost (Gross et.a!. 2003). There is also
worry over the supply of raw materials for the manufacturing of photovoltaic cells,
which has led to more money being spent on research and development (Pieper
2009).
The newest solar technologies include thin film modules, which are less
ex pensive and do not req uire the same amnunt of raw materi als, and semi-conductive
pol ymers (Gross et.a!. 2003). Solar technologies are also being integrated into new
construction, replacing conventional cladding materials such as roofing tiles with
roofing tiles with built in photovoltaics (Gross et.a!. 2003). When replacing other
materials , the integrated photovoltaics are at or close to commercial viability (Gross
et.a!' 2003).

Modern Biomass
Modem biomass is perhaps the most di verse set of alternative energies
including both solid and liquid biomass, as well as gases produced from the
decomposition processes of waste materials (Gross et.a!' 2003). Solid biomass
includes sources, such as forest and agricultural industry byproducts, inputs that
would otherwise simply be thrown out, as well as crops (i.e. com, switchgrass, forests)
grown directly for fuel consumption (Pieper 2009). Solid biomass can be burned
directly in much the same way that coal is burned in contemporary power plants to
produce energy or it can be processed to create liquid or gaseous nlels (Gross et.a!'
2003).
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In addition , there are several different processes that can be used to convert
solid biomass into liquid or gas forms , including gasification, pyrolysis, anaerobic
digestion , and physical-chemical conversion (Gross et. al. 2003). Through these
processes, biomass is made available for use as renewable gaso lin e and biodiesei,
thereby powering certain vehicles for transportation needs and reducing a country' s
dependence on oil even morc (DOE:EERE 20 I 0 "Biomass"). Brazil's use of sugar
cane is one example of a country where reliance on biomass for transportation needs
has accomplished this goal.
Another major source of biomass as energy is the capture of landfill gas ,
which can be as much as 50% methane (Gross et.al. 2003). The gas is produced
through the natural decomposition of wastes stored in landfills, with most of it
escaping to the atmosphere; when captured it can be used for heat and electricity
(Pieper 2009).
Most forms of biomass are commercially viab le, with the newer technologies
slowly making their way into the market (Gross et.al. 2003). There are ongoing
debates about the wisdom of growi ng crops to meet food-vs.-fuel needs with some
biomass technologies, but the trend in many places (e.g., U.S. Midwest, parts of
Brazil) has been for some farmers to transition from growing crops for food to use in
fuel production (e.g., corn, soybeans), particularly when growing on marginal land or
those that can be produced in mass quantities, such as switchgrass and algae (DOE:
EERE 2010 "Biomass").
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Water, Wave and Tidal Stream
Water has long been used as a renewable energy, with most of the attention
recently focused on large-scale hydroelectric dams. Dams, however, can be very
ecologically damaging (e.g. , disrupting sediment flows , altering native fish
communities), so the creation of new ones is considered undesirable by many
ecologists? but modemization and new ecological standards can keep CWTent dams
open (Pieper 2009). With water as an energy source, most of the attention has tumed
off-shore to hamessing wave and tidal stream energy. Wave and tidal stream energy
are not as close to commercial viability as wind and solar, but many different designs
and devices exist and the research into the most effective ones is continuing (Gross
et.a!. 2003).

Geoth ermal
Geothermal energy uses the energy of the earth for heating or to create
electricity (DOE: EERE 20 I 0 "GeotheITllal"). The energy is very site specific, with
some sites having plenty of energy, white other may have next to none (Pieper, 2009) .
Harnessing the energy requires drilling into the ground to first access the temperature
differential, which at some sites is enough to create steam to power turbines, while on
other sites it may only be enough keep a house at the temperature of the ground in
that depth (DOE:EERE 20 I 0 "Geothermal"). The research into the best ways of
harnessing the geothermal power is still ongoing, with attention being paid to the best
ways to produce electricity using it (DOE: EERE 20 I 0 "Geothermal").
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Advantages of Alternative Energies
Alternative energies have many advantages, including sustainability and the
economic and national security that comes with local fuel sources, which is why they
are an attractive prospect for replacing more conventional fuel sources. They are seen
as a way to promote domestic industrial development, reduce carbon emissions, and
decrease reliance on foreign fossi l fuels (Komar & Bazilian 2005). In creating new
industries, alternative energies a lso open up many job opportunities in the
manufacturing, constructing and installing of the equipment, and in operating and
maintaining the equipment over its lifespan (Lewis & Wiser 2005). The wind industry,
for example, is credited with creating more jobs per dollar investment and per
kilowatt-hour generated than the power generated by fossil fuels (Lewis & Wiser
2005). Not only do alternative energies produce more jobs, but in a time when
sustai nability is important, alternative energies manage to fu lfill that requirement
where fossil fuels fall short.

Alternative energies achi eve the sustainability that is needed when looking for
a new fuel source to replace fossil fuels. Sustainability is traditionally defined as
"meeting the basic economic, social, and security needs now and in the future without
undermining the natural resource base or environmental quality on which both life
and the economy depend" (Hecht & Miller 20 I 0). Fossil fuels fail to meet any of the
criteria, as their use undermines the future resource base, and their use also
contributes greatly to global climate change through the emission of greenhouse gases
(GHG) (Hecht & Miller 2010). Alternative energies, on the other hand, are renewable
and do not contribute to the GHG load in the atmosphere through their operation
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(Gross et.a!. 2003). Wind , so lar, geothennal, and the various forms of water-based
energy are all zero emission sources (Gross et.a!' 2003). Biomass, on the other hand ,
releases carbon dioxide but is considered carbon neutral as the carbon dioxide that is
released into the atmosphere dUling the use of the fuels is offset by the uptake of
carbon dioxide while growing the plants that make up the fuel (Gross et.a!. 2003).
These factors make it clear that alternative energy is currently the best option for
replacing an unsustainable energy system. Updating unsustainable energy sources,
howevcr, is not an easy process, and its success depends on the functioning of energy
markets.

TIL Energy Markets and the Diffusion of Technology

Energy Markets
Energy markets, like many other markets, are profit driven, and even the most
beneficial of technologies may have trouble entering the market (Brown 2001). This
can be explained through the set of market failures and barriers that exist which
prevent newer technologies from gaining the foothold that they need to make progress
(Brown 200 I). The market failures and barriers can range from unpriced costs, that is,
the external social or ecological costs of conventional encrgy that are not factored
into its market price, to policies that are hostile to new technologies, with each factor
affecting if and how new technologies entcr a market (Brown 200 I). Most of the
failures and barriers to market entrance can be explained through the analytical
framework on technological systems laid out by Jacobsson and Johnson (2000), and
expanded on by Jacobsson and Bergek (2004).
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Techllological Systems Framework
The technological systems framework strives to explain how technology
emerges in and diffuses through a market. The framework takes several factors into
consideration, including that innovation and diffusion happen both at the level of a
single fiml (i.e. business) as well as at the market level , and that technology choice
does not rely solely on individual films, but that individual fillllS take their cues from
an "innovation system" that has variables other than the price of the technology
(Jacobsson & Johnson 2000). The technology system is made up of three main parts:
the actors and their competence, networks, and institutions (Jacobsson & Johnson
2000). The interaction of the three groups is what can either drive a technology to
become successful in a relatively short period of time, or what can cause a technology
to fail to enter the market at all (Jacobsson & Johnson 2000).
The actors in the framework constitute firms , users, suppliers, venture
capitalists, and other organizations with an interest in the technology being
considered (Jacobsson & Bergek 2004). Especially important are those with the
technical , financial or political power to influence the process of technology
development or diffusion (Jacobsson & Bergek 2004).
The networks in the framework serve as channels for the transfer of
knowledge between the actors (Jacobsson & Johnson 2000). The networks not only
allow for the actors to gain knowledge of potential problems and the developments of
solutions, but may also serve to influence the institutional set-up (Jacobsson &
Bergek 2004). The more integrated actors are in their networks, the better the
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diffusion ofinfonnation among them , but it also may color their perceptions of what
is possible or desirable when it comes to the technology they are developing and so
guide their decisions (Jacobsson & Bergek 2004).

The institutions in the framework create the norms and rules that the actors
and their networks must follow (Jacobsson & Bergek 2004). The institution include
governments and specific legislation, policies intended to interpret legislation, longheld legal nonns, the market itself, the educational system, and even local culture, as
they all influence the process (Jacobsson & Johnson 2000). Institutions are very
powerful when it comes to the development and use of new technologies, influencing
everything from incentive and demand structures to connectivity among actors
(Jacobsson & Bergek 2004). Institutional support can greatly influence the path that a
technology takes, as it can work through policy changes to open markets that may be
otherwise unavailable (Jacobsson & Johnson 2000). While government is usually the
most important of the institutions as it creates the policies and legislation that can
open markets, the long-held nonns and culture also play major roles, as the public
often influences the direction that the government is willing to go with legislation.

The interactions of the three sections of the technological system serve many
functions. The most important of these relate to the creation and diffusion of new
knowledge, the guidance of the technology both in design and in growth potential, the
supply of resources, and the creation of markets for the technology (Jacobsson &
Bergek 2004). Each of the functions serves to bolster the others; for example: more
resources in the system will create more knowledge, and the creation of markets may
bring in more resources as more finns corne in to take advantage of market
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opportunities (Jacobsson & Bergek 2004). Since the system is reliant on feedback
loops, a weak or hostile response from any of the components of the system can
damage a technology ' s chance of entering the market (Jacobsson & Johnson 2000).

The Technological System and the Formation ofMarkets
Technologies and industries have two main phases in their development: the
fonllative phase and market expansion (Jacobsson & Bergek 2004). It is during the
fonnative phase that technologies require the most support from the actors, networks ,
and institutions that make up the technological system as this phase features high
market and legislative uncertainty (Jacobs son & Bergek 2004). Support from the
actors and institutions may serve to create protected markets where the technology
can grow without influence or competition from incumbent technologies, which have
the advantage of the stability and legitimacy that comes with having passed from the
formative stage (Jacobsson & Bergek 2004). These markets serve as " nursing markets"
for the technologies, allowing the price and perfonnance of the technology to
improve, attracting new firms, and slowly building the legitimacy of the technology
in the eyes of the market (Jacobsson & Bergek 2004).

Once additional firms enter a market, they bring with them new knowledge,
and build greater networks among themselves (Johnsson & Bergek 2004). This also
adds to the legitimacy of the technology, which may influence institutional change
(Johnsson & Bergek 2004). It is institutional change that ends up making or breaking
a new technology. Institutional change results in more money being spent on the
research and development of the technology, as well as the creation of new policy
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which may give the new technology a boost to allow it to compete against the
incumbents (Johnsson & Bergek 2004).
In the energy sector especially, incumbent technologies pose the greatest
barrier to the adoption of new and upcoming technologies, such as alternative energy
sources, as the incumbents hold most of the institutional power (Jacobsson & Johnson
2000). Since alternative energies are by their definition alternatives to the incumbent
technologies such as coal and oil, their adoption involves displacing the incumbent
technologies. The incumbent technologies will therefore often lobby to prevent the
adoption of new technologies to protect their own position in the market, and without
institutional support new technologies can be effectively prevcnted from gaining a
foothold in the market (Jacobsson & Johnson 2000).

Effective policy support is needed to prevent incumbent technologies from
closing the markets to new technologies. In the case of alternative energies, many
policy mechanisms can be used, some of which have already proven successful , while
other policy mechanisms are newer and have yet to be proven. In the next section, [
review the cases ofGennany and the United States and detail the actions that they
have taken, or have not taken, through institutional policy to encourage the expansion
and diffusion of alternative energy technologies in the energy markets. Before
focusing on policy specifically, however, I briefly place policy formulation within the
context of environmental awareness among each country's public, as the public can
be a major driving force behind policy initiatives.
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rv.

Alternative Energy Policy in Germany

Environmental Awareness alld the German Stale
The earliest instances of environmental awareness in the German state
happened in the late 19 th century when air pollution from industrial activities first
became a major issue (Schruers 2002). The government gave local authorities the
power to regulate those industries through a permining process as early as 1895
(Schruers 2002). When stricter regulations were sought in 1959, due to more
industries turning to highly polluting oil heating, slow progress in creating technical
guidelines and opposition from the industries and from the Ministry of Economics
managed to kill the law before it could be passed (Schruers 2002). This opposition
was the pattern for many years; however, people were slowly becoming more
environmentally aware and demanding the same of their government (Schruers 2002).

The first major turning point in environmental policy for Germany happened
in 1969, when the Social Democratic Party (SPD, Sozialdemokralische Pm'lei

Deutchlands) 1 and Liberal Democrats (FDP, Freie Demokratische Parteil [ornled a
coalition. Tn 1970 the coaliti on introduced the Emergency Program for Environmental
Protection, which introduced measures for issues like air and water pollution, waste
management, nature protection, and even noise pollution (Schruers 2002). Then in
1971 , the coalition announced its Environmental Program, elevating environmental

I

The SPD is a center-len party traditionally representing the working c lass; it works lowards aligning

capitalism and social justice and represents a "third-way" or centrist approach to politics.
' The FDP is a pro-business party that promotes the free market economy, limited government and
individual freedom.
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protection to a similar level of importance as education, social security, and defense
(Schruers 2002).

The 1970s also saw the energy crisis, which was a major turning point for
energy policy (Jacobsson & Lauber 2006). Up until the 1973 OPEC oil crisis,
Gennany, like many other countries, enjoyed low cost oil as one of their main energy
imports, but the spike in oil prices in 1973 led to a rethinking of the country ' s rcliance
on foreign energy (Wi.istenhagen & Bilharz 2006). At first, the emphasis was on an
increased use of coal and nuclear power; however, nuclear power soon became highly
controversial with the public (Jacobsson & Lauber 2006).

The first peak of anti-nuclear protests happened in 1974, with civil society
organizations protesting against a planned nuclear plant in southwestern Germany
(Wi.istenhagen & Bilharz 2006). Then, in 1986 the Chernobyl nuclear accident turned
public opinion even further away from nuclear energy, as opposition soared to 70 %
within two years, leaving the field open for other sources of energy (Lipp 2007).

Formation of the Green Party
Public opposition to nuclear power also led to the formation of the Green
party (Die Griinen), the party that has been the most instrumental in campaigning for
alternativc energies (Wi.istenhagen & Bilharz 2006). Thc Greens got their start in
1977 as a citizen initiative against a nuclear plant project in Lower Saxony
(Niedersachsen) (Oberreuter 1990). Originally the party was called the

Umwellschutzpartei Niedersachsen (USP), or the Environmental Protection party of
Lower Saxony. By December of the same year the USP had joined forces with the
16

Green List for Environmental Protection (Griill en Liste Umweltsclrutz) to fonn the
GLP (Oberreuter 1990). Tn 1981 , the party in Niedersachsen officially starting calling
itself the Green party and by the next election they man aged to get 6.5 % of the vote,
thereby securing II seats in the Lower Saxon parliament (Oberreuter 1990)3 The
Green party's success was similar in other federal states (Sundes/ander) , with Green
parties founded in most states between the years of 1978 and 1980 (Obben'euter
1990). Most of the state Green parties also made it into their state parliaments within
a few years of their founding (Obberreuter 1990). The national Green party was
founded in 1980, and gained the necessary votes to enter the parliament in 1983 with
27 seats (Obberreuter 1990).

While the party initially started out as a one-issue party, their ascent to the
national parliament necessitated an expansion of their ideology (Obberreuter 1990).
The new ideology of the Green party centers on ecological sustainability, workers '
rights, democracy, and nonviolence (Obberreuter 1990). With this new ideology the
Greens stood to become one of the driving forces for change in the German
government, especially in the arena of environmenta l issues.

Early Support for Renewable Energy
In 1980, an Enquete Commission (Enquelecommission) consisting of equal
numbers of members of parliament and experts with the right to vote concluded that
to deal with energy, Germany's first priority should be energy efficiency and
renewables (Jacobs son & Lauber 2006). At the time, the commission did not take

J Within the German electoral system, both at the federal and state level , parties must win at least 5%
of the vote before they can be awarded scats in parliament.
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nuclear power off the table (Jacobsson & Lauber 2006). However, a five-year study
commissioned by the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology and published
around the time of the Chernobyl accident pointed out that a focus on renewable and
energy efficiency would be less expensive than more nuclear power (Jacobsson &
Lauber 2006).

While early commission findings were in support of renewables, this is not to
say that the government fully backed renewable energy from the start. The politicaleconomic atmosphere in Gernlany at the time was largely hostilc to the entrance of a
new technology into the market (Jacobsson & Lauber 2006). This was made even
more difficult by major incentives givcn to the otherwise non-competitive hard coal
industry after the oil crisis, and by the Ministry of Economic Affairs' unwillingness to
create new markets for renewables (Jacobsson & Lauber 2006). At the time, public
opinion echoed the non-action taken by the government as only 16 % of Germans
thought that wind and solar could be a significant source of energy within 20 to 30
years (Wiistenhagen & Bilharz 2006).

While the Ministry of Economic Affairs was largely uninterested in renewable
energies, the Ministry of Research tried to support renewables through research
funding (Jacobsson & Lauber 2006). The research funding was not anywhere near the
funding that was provided to projects for nuclear and coal power development,
reaching a peak of about 300 million DM (Deutsche Mark) in 1982 (Jacobsson &
Lauber 2006). One of the highest profile projects suppolted by the Ministry worked to
create the largest wind turbine in the world (Wiistenhagen & Bilharz 2006). The
project, unfortunately, proved to be a failure, giving traditional utilities a seeming
18

confirmation to their skeptical attitudes toward alternative energies (Wi.istenhagen &
Bilharz 2006). After the failure of the large-scale project, attention turned to smaller
wind turbines, which proved to be much more successful (Wi.istenhagen & Bilharz
2006).

In 1982, another change in governments oCCUlTed, as the SPDIFDP coalition
was turned out by a more conservative coalition of the Christian Democratic Union
(CDU, Demokratische Unioll Deutschlollds)4 and the FOP (Jacobsson & Lauber
2006). At that point funding for Research & Development (R&D) for renewable
energy dropped dramatically, but projects to demonstrate the viability of wind and
solar continued as small farmers and a rising demand for green power created niche
markets (Jacobsson & Lauber 2006). More films continued to enter the market during
the 1980s, mostly in the wind turbine industry, although market success in installed
power by 1989 was limited at only 20MW (Wi.istenhagen & Bilharz 2006).

More changes to the energy market came as a result of the Chernobyl accident
in 1986 (Jacobsson & Lauber 2006). As public approval of nuclear power fell , the
SPD committed to the phasing out of nuclear plants, and the Greens demanded an
immediate shutdown, necessitating the development of another energy source to
replace it (Jacobsson & Lauber 2006). That same year a report was published warning
of a potential climate disaster if carbon dioxide emissions were not curtailed
(Jacobsson & Lauber 2006). Worries over increased oil consumption increased as oil

The CDU is Germany ' s main conservative palty, advocating creating and maintaining govemment
frameworks for fair competition in the economy, low unemployment, and social welfare. They orten
share power with the Christian Social Union (CSU, Christlich-Soziale Unioll ill Bayem), their
eounterpalt in the state of Bavaria, although their relationship is often uneasy due to the CSU 's more
conservative stance on social issues.
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prices fell , leading to a general agreement in the government that the way energy was
used needed to be dramatically changed (Jacobsson & Lauber 2006).

Among the first steps that the Gennan government took towards a renewable
energy policy came in 1989; new policies aimed at installing I OOMW of wind power
by providing incentives to generators (Wiistenhagen & Bilharz 2006). The program
was ambitious , as the total installed wind power at the time was just 20MW. The
program offered wind power generators 3 Cents/kWh , and by 1991 the production
goal was expanded to 250MW (Wiistenhagen & Bilharz 2006). To promote solar
power, the Ministries of Research and of the Environmcnt created a " 1,000 roofs"
program , which aimed at installing solar cells on I ,000 roofs in Germany (Jacobsson
& Lauber 2006). Arguably, the most significant renewable energy policy came in
1990, with the passing of the Feed-in Law that came into effect in 1991.

StromeillspeisLingsgesetz (StrEG)

The Feed-in Law of 1991 (SlromeinspeisLingsgeselz, StrEG) was Gennany'S
most important step toward renewable energy, and one that received unanimous
support from the parliament (Wiistenhagen & Bilharz 2006). The list of supporters of
the law spanned almost the entire political spectrum, with support from the
CDU/CSU, the SPD, and the Greens (Wiistenhagen & Bilharz 2006). The FDP was
the only party that did not fully support the law, partly because they viewed it as too
interventionist (Wiistenhagen & Bilharz 2006).

The law was first introduced by solar associations such as Association for the
Advancement of Solar Energy (Forderverein Solarenergie, SFV) and Eurosolar, and
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an association of about 3,500 small hydro power plant owners (Jacobsson & Lauber
2006). The owners of the hydro power plants were mostly conservatives, and so were
able to lobby the conservatives in the government for their support (Jacobsson &
Lauber 2006). The only real opposition that the StIEG faced was from the power
companies, which believed that the law would result in a reduction of their influence
(Wi.istenhagen & Bilharz 2006). Even so, the opposition was not very strong as the
utilities did not believe that they had anything to fear from small hydro power
projects, and were instead focused on the takeover of East Gennany's electric grid as
a part of the reunification process (Jacobsson & Lauber 2006).

The law itselfwas a price regime law, as it set the prices for renewable
energies and let the market detelmine how much electricity would be produced
(Wi.istenhagen & Bilharz 2006). The StrEG had two main components: compensation
for the renewable generators detennined as a percentage of the average tariff, and the
obligation for the grid operators to buy the renewably generated electricity (Lipp
2007). These factors together created a relatively stable market for finns to enter,
where they were guaranteed both a buyer and a price that could compete with
conventional energies, taking away some of the investment risk inherent in the system
(Wi.istenhagen & Bilharz 2006).

The parliament had also declared that the purpose of the StrEG was to level
the playing field between renewable and conventional energies by factoring in the
external costs of conventional cnergy (Jacobs son & Lauber 2006). The external costs
are a range of negative impacts from the "discovery, distribution, and consumption of
fuels and power," and as most of those costs are social, including things such as
21

pollution or GHG emission, they are often unpriced (Brown 200 I). Conventional
fuels produce many oftbese costs, and society as a whole bears the weight of them ,
whereas most alternative energies do not produce the same externalities for society
(Brown 200 I). The German government at the time priced the externalities of coal at
3-5 cents per kWh , and so adjusted the pI-ice of renew abIes accordingly (Jacobsson &
Lauber 2006). However, no one foresaw just how successful thc combination of price
adjustment and grid access would be.
The StrEG led to 490MW of installed wind power by 1995 , up from just
20MW in 1989, while also creating new networks for the wind suppliers (Jacobsson
& Lauber 2006). Even more importantly, it led to a growth in the political power of
the wind industry, which was able to add economic factors to their arguments for
policies that supported the development of more wind power (Jacobsson & Johnson
2000). This political power was then brought to bear when it came time to update the
StrEG, this time without the benefit of unaware incnmbent power producers.
Once it became clear the wind power and other alternative energies could pose
a threat to conventional power generators, the conventional power generators began
to attack the StrEG (Jacobsson & Lauber 2006). They argued that the burden of
supporting alternative energies unfairly fell to specific geographical locations, as
those locations with the largest wind resources were the ones to develop wind power
and the power utilities in those areas had to pay to support them, and that the
subsidies that supported the law were too great (Jacobsson & Lauber 2006). The
German Association of Electric Utilities (VDEW, Verband del' Elektrizitatswirtschaji)
also filed a lawsuit with the European Commission alleging that the StrEG violated
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state-aid rules (Wiistenhagen & Bilharz 2006). The objections by the power
companies also led to uncertainty in the market, as investors wondered if the law
would change, and the market stagnated between 1996 and 1998 (J acobsson &
Lauber 2006).
The objections to the StrEG led to amendments to the law in 1998
(Wiistenhagen & Bilharz 2006). The amendments updated hardship clauses for the
utilities, allowing for a twofold 5 % cap, which first moved the obligation to pay to
the upstream grid operator after the 5 % of renewable energy was reached in a supply
area, and then took away the obligation to pay once the upstream grid operator also
reached 5 % (Wiistenhagen & Bilharz 2006). 1998, however, also saw the turnover of
the government with the COUIFOP coalition giving way to a SOP/Green coalition, a
coalition that declared itself for " Ecological Modernization" with a focus on
renewable energies and energy efficiency as one of its main goals (Wiistenhagen &
Bilharz 2006).

100,000 Roof Program and {he Erneuerbare-Energie-Geselz (EEG)
Following further changes in the federal government, the new coalition set its
sights on improving the rcnewable energy policies. While wind power benefited the
most from the StrEG, solar power was also fairly successful under the J ,000 roof
program. Solar finns such as Eurosolar lobbied in 1993 and 1996 for an expansion to
the program to expand the market for solar that the 1,000 roof program had created
(Jaeobsson & Lauber 2006). The proposed 100,000 roof program was unsuccessful
under the COU/FDP coalition, but the SDP and Greens committed themselves to the
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market expansion of solar and pushed the program through by January 1999
(Jacobsson & Lauber 2006). Later in the same year, the coalition launched reforms to
the StrEG, which were mostly ignored by the Ministry of Economics, the ministry
that was charged with the regulation of the law (Jacobsson & Lauber 2006). In
response the parliament submitted a member's bill , (unclear) which despite the
Ministry's attempts at diluting it, passed, becoming the Erll euerbare-Energie-Geselz
(EEG) or the Renewable Energy Sources Act (Jacobsson & Lauber 2006).

The EEG strived to address many of the problems that created market
uncertainty under the StrEG. While the StrEG was considered a general success, the
liberalization of the energy markets that occurred in 1998 threatened its fimction
(Wiistenhagen & Bilharz 2006). Under the liberalization, energy prices started to
drop , and with them so did the compensation to renewable energy developers,
providing them with less money for their investment and jeopardizing their
competiveness with conventional energies (Lipp 2007). Ln direct response to the
uncertainty caused by the StrEG's pricing scheme, the EEG created a price scheme
that featured prices that would be set for a period of 20 years and not reliant on
market price (Wiistenhagen & Bilharz 2006). This created a very stable market for
firms to enter, as they were not only guaranteed a price, but were guaranteed it for a
set period of time. The EEG also addressed concems about geographic burdens by
creating a system to settle regional cost disparities and to entitle the utilities to
compensation under the law if they themselves built plants to generate renewable
energy, something they were previously exempt from (Wiistenhagen & Bilharz 2006).
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While allowing utilities to access the incentives provided by the EEG broke
up some of the opposition, most of the opposition that the law faced still came from
the utilities and their industry associations, with very little opposition actually coming
from the other parties in parliament (Wiistenhagen & Bilharz 2006). This is not to say
that the EEG was passed under an all-party consensus like the StrEG, since while the
other parties did not disagree with the law fundamentally, they did disagree with the
details of the draft (Wiistenhagen & Bilharz 2006). Most of the disagreement from
the conservatives in the CDU/CSU and the liberals in the FDP was tempered by the
lobbying from the wind and solar industries, which had gained considerable economic
power under the StrEG (Jacobsson & Johnson 2000). The issues raised concerning
the law's interventionist nature, and its impact on energy prices did not prevent the
law from passing with clear majorities in both chambers of the parliament
(Wiistenhagen & Bilharz 2006).

After the law passed, there was still a lack of policy commitment as the
Ministry that was charged with the enforcement of the law still did not believe in the
viability of renewable energies (Lipp 2007). In the 2002 elections, the Green party
gained more support over the SPD, which gave them the power to move the
responsibility over renewable energies from the SPD-held Ministry of Economics to
the Green-held Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety
(BMU) (Jacobsson & Lauber 2006). The BMU was more willing to support the
renewable energy sector with more cohesive policy application (Lipp 2007).
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Effectivelless of th e EEG
The passing of the EEG was a testament both to the dedication of the
SPD/Green coalition and to the growing power of wind and solar industries. Since
then, there have been several attacks on it, such as when Conservative and Liberal
leaders attacked the EEG subsidies for being a burden on the budget in 2003 , even
though the subsidies are paid for by the consumers (Jacob son & Lauber 2006). Most
of the opposition, however, has been mostly "half-hearted" as those that oppose
renewable energy tend to lose popularity among voters (Wustenhagen & Bilharz
2006). Even the CDU/CSU and SPD coalition elected in 2005 has been hesitant to
completely criticize the law due to the number of jobs it has created (Lipp 2007).

Since the passing of the EEG, the act has been amended in 2004, 2008, and
20 10, keeping the same basic framework. The 2004 amendments to the act added
hardship clauses for medium and large consumers (Wustenhagen & Bilharz 2006)
and added provisions to make sure that renewable energy expansion was compatible
with nature conservation objectives (BMU 2007). The act states that its purpose is to
"facilitate sustainable development of energy supply, particularly for the sake of
protecting our climate and environment" and has provisions for monitoring its
effectiveness in various sectors, including environmental and economic factors as
well as the amount of renewable energy power that is installed (BMU 2008).

By 2006, the amount of installed wind power in Gennany had reached
20,622MW, with 2,224MW installed during that year alone (BMU 2007). This
number is up dramatically from the inception of the original Feed-in tariff law. The
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other sources of renewable energy also saw growth under the law with 598.4MW of
bi omass power installations in 1996, and 950MW of photovoltaic solar installations
(BMU 2007). The act also met its goals in regard to environmental and economic
impacts. In 2006 the carbon dioxide emissions avoided tlu'ough the use of renewable
energies totaled about 44 million tons, more than any other policy aimed at energy or
environmental refoml (BMU 2007). Meanwhile, the number of jobs available in the
renewable energy sector has increased from 160,000 to 236,000 between 2004 and
2006, with 134,000 of the jobs directly attributed to the EEG (BMU 2007).
The EEG also set goals for the increase in the share of renewable energies
used in energy generation, which the progress report indicates have been exceeded
ahead of time, as the 2010 target of 12.5% was reached by 2007 (BMU 2007). The
progress report also points out that because of the EEG, Gennany should have no
problem of reaching the European Union's target of20% by 2020, and should come
in at about 25-30% by that year (BMU 2007).

The success of the EEG has led to the new policies aimed at targeting
development of other sources in the energy sector as well. The Erneuerbare-

Energien- Warmegesetz (EEWarmeG) or Renewable Energies Heat Act, is a relatively
new act passed in 2008 that aims to increase the amount of renewable energies used
to heat buildings (BMU EEWarmeG 2008) . The act stipulates that all new
construction built after January 1,2010 must use renewable energies to provide a
certain percentage of their heating and cooling, with the percentage being regulated
depending on the type of renewable energy used (BMU EEWtirmeG 2008). The act is
set up in much the same way as the EEG to encourage market expansion for
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renewable heatin g and cooling technologies to accomplish the act's goal of 14% of all
heat ing in Gennany being from renewabl e energies by 2020.

V. Alternative Energy in the United States
Environmental Awareness in the Un ited States
The modem environmental movement in the United States started early.
Books such as Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, Barry Commoner's The Closing Circle
and Paul Ehrlich's Th e Population Bomb pl ayed a major role in bringing the topics of
pollution, nuclear testing, and the pressures of a rising population to the public eye in
the 1960s (Schreurs 2002). Groups such as the National Resources Defense Counci I
(NRDC), the Friends of the Earth , and Greenpeace soon organized on the national
level , with others such as the Sierra Club broadening their mi ss ions from a focus on
nature protection, in order to pressure the government and industries to change theiT
policies with regard to resource consumption and pollution production (Schreurs
2002).
Until the I 960s, environmental issues were mostly considered a problem to be
handled by governments at the local or state level , with little intervention from the
federal government (Schreurs 2002). The first nationally enacted law that addressed
environmental issues was the 1955 air pollution act, which passed only after health
concerns were raised as dozens of people died from "killer smog" (Schreurs 2002).
The act was updated in 1963 with passage of the first Clean Air Act, but this act
suffered from a general unwil lingness on Congress' part to allow for federal
regulatory authority over the enforcement of the environmental standards. Instead, the
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legislation relied on the states to voluntarily comply with regulations (Schreurs 2002).
It took the death of an estimated 80 people in New York City from the effects of air
pollution during a four-day atmospheric inversion, in which smog became trapped
ncar the eal1h 's surface by a layer of air above it, for Congress to finally allow the
federal govenUllent to enforce federal standards under the newly created Air Quality
Act of 1967 (Schreurs 2002).

After passage of the Air Quality Act, the environment became one of the most
important issues facing the government, as pressure mounted for the federal
government to create more regulations (Schreurs 2002). This pressure resulted in a
massive burst of new environmental policy stal1ing with the National Environmental
Protection Act (NEPA), which required government agencies to consider the
environmental impacts of their actions (Dryzek et.a!' 2002). The US also set up the
Environmental Protection Agency, and passed more laws on air and water pollution,
and set out to protect endangered species (Dryzek et.a!' 2002).

During this era, the United States was the leader in environmental policy and
environmental awareness, with many other countries using the enacted laws as their
guide to create their own laws (Dryzek et.a!' 2002). The laws of other countries were
rarely as strong as those in the US, since these other countries often lacked the sense
of urgency that American environmental groups had brought to the process (Dlyzek
et.a!' 2002). However, this era was exceedingly short, and when the 1973 oil crisis hit,
all new steps to strengthen environmental policy were halted (Dryzek et.a!. 2002).
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Th e US Response to the Oil Crisis
Ln 1973 members of the Organi zation of Petroleum-Exporting Countries
(OPEC) made major changes to their policies, and limited the supply of oil available
to drive up prices (Klass 2003). The ensuing price increases- from $2 a barrel to $13 a

barrel- left the economies of countries reliant on oil , such as the United States,
reeling (Klass 2003). In response, the US began focusing much of its attention on
supporting the economy instead of environmental laws (Dryzek et.al. 2002).
The energy crisis shook the US and demonstrated that its economy was
vulnerable to the whims of the OPEC nations , and so the US began focusing on ways
to prevent this from happening again . Money was put towards R&D efforts in nuclear
and alternative energies, principally as a way of guaranteeing domestic energy
sources (Kobos et.al. 2006). 8y1978, the passage of the National Energy Aet resulted
in new regulations that were meant to stimulate the growth of alternative energies
(McVeigh et.al. 1999). The Committee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems in
1979 predicated that the US would reach around 140,000MW of wind power by the
year 2000, with private sector estimates mostly agreeing and even surpassing the
Committee's estimates (Kobos et.al. 2006). However, these estimates would not be
met.

After the oil crisis was over and prices started to drop, so did thc interest in
non-fossil fuel energies (Kobos et.al. 2006). Nuclear power saw a decline in
popularity after the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 with worries over the safety of
nuclear power at the forefront (McVeigh et.al. 1999). Alternative energies, however,
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were dealt an even worse blow. With the arrival of the Reagan Administration, the
1980s saw a resurgence in the "free-market" ideo logy, and the federal government cut
off R&D funds dramaticall y (Kobos et.a\. 2006). Between 1980 and 1996 the energy
technology budget in the US decreased by 74%, preventing the kind of advancement
in technology that Gennany saw (Margoli s & Kammen 1999). Th e lack of R&D
funding came coupled with price subsidies to conventional fuels, and overall falling
fuel prices, with the result that alternative energies looked even less attractive to the
market, which led many to tum away from altern ative energies completely (McVeigh
et.a\. 1999).

Public Utility RegulatolY Policies Act al/d EI/ergy Tax Act of 1978
Given the low political priority for a lternative energi es and the low prices and
high subsidies enjoyed by conventional technology, policies in the US for alternative
energies have been few and far between. Two of the first policies that addressed
alternative energies in any significant way were the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act (PURPA) and the Energy Tax Act of 1978.

PURPA served to open the door for non-utility power generation for resale
(McVeigh et.a\. 1999). The aet itself was part of the National Energy Act, and was
aimed at the "conservation of energy supplied by electric utilities, optimal efficiency
of electric utility facilities and resources, and equitable rate for electric consumers"
(Rose & Meeusen 2006). The language of the act, however, required actions only
among those utilities that have natural monopolies, with state regulated utilities and
unregulated utilities being exempt (Rose & Meeusen 2006). The most that state and
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unregulated utilities are required to do in tenns of the act is to "consider" the
standards for electric utilities including: cost of service, declining block rates, timeof-day rates, seasonal rates and interruptible rates (Rose & Meeusen 2006). The
natural monopoly utilities are forced to buy power from more efficient providers at an
" avoided cost" price (Sissine 200 I). This price was based on the energy and capacity
costs that would be incurred by the utility if the utility were generating the power
itself, or were buying the power from somewhere else (Sissine 200 I). This was meant
to encourage the development of renewable technologies in the free market by

providing them access to the grid in places where they otherwise may not be able to
access it due to the presence of energy monopolies (Sissine 200 I).

The National Energy Act also featured the Energy Tax Act, which provided
tax incentives to stimulate the commercialIzation of renewable energies (Wiser &
Pickle 1998). The purpose of the act was to offset the tax-related barriers that
alternative energies faced in the market (Sissine 200 I). These barriers were often the
tax breaks that were provided to conventional energies but not to alternative energies
(Sissine 200 I). The act strove to correct this imbalance by providing tax breaks to
residential users of alternative energies, with a focus on solar power (Sissine 200 I).
Later tax breaks in 1982 targeted businesses with Investment Tax Credits (ITC)
(Wiser & Pickle 1998).

The tax credits, however, faced a major problem in their implementation.
Since they were tied to capital investment and not project performance, they resulted
in large additions to renewable energy capacity, but little was done in the way of
improving that capacity afterward (Wiser & Pickle 1998). This in a sense stalled the
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new renewable energy pl ants, as the tax breaks encouraged building them , but not
running them or improving their efficiency or output. As a response to this problem ,
the 1986 Tax Reform Act reduced the incentives available (Wiser & Pickle 1998).

Energy Policy Act oj 1992
The Federal government launched another set of tax incentives as a part of the
omnibus energy legi slation created with the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (Wiser &
Pickle 1998). Thi s law permanently extended the 10% ITC for non-utility investors in
solar and geothcrmal, and created a 10 year I.S ¢/kWh Production Tax Credit (PTC)
for wind and closed-loop biomass (Wiser & Pickle 1998). The law also created a
renewab le energy productive incentive (REPT) of the same value as the PTC, but
available as a cash incentive to non-profit groups and local government agencies that
wish to produce electricity from wind and close-loop biomass (Sissine 200 I). By
creating a Production Tax Credit (PTC), the US government solved the problem of
plants being built and then not run efficiently or improved , but the REPI brought with
it its own set of problems (Wiser & Pickle 1998).

In theory, these federal tax credits should have provided enough incentive to
get new firms into the market; however, the way the credits were set up created a
situation where many of the firm s that would have benefited from them , could not
fully utilize them (Wiser & Pickle 1998). To fully benefit from tax crcdits an investor
must have a sufficient income for a tax load, which many investors in the renewable
energy ficld do not (Wiser & Pickle 1998). Often these investors fall under the
alternative minimum tax (AMT) requirements that were set up with the 1986 Tax
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Refonn (Wiser & Pickle 1998). The AMT guarantees that taxpayers pay a minimum
level of taxes, with most tax credits not counting towards it, and the tax is calculated
less favorably than the nonnal tax system (Wiser & Pickle 1998). Jrthe tax calculated
by the AMT is higher than the regular tax , then the film must pay the AMT (Wiser &
Pickle 1998). This can result in the tax credits either being postponed, during which
time they lose their value, or not being used at all if the finn is perpetually limited by
the AMT (Wiser & Pickle 1998).

REPI faced even larger problems than the PTC, as the funding for the project
is subject to yearly congressional appropriations (Wiser & Pickle 1998). The 1992
Act only authorized appropriations for 1993-1995 , requiting Congress to also renew
the authority to make the appropriations (Wiser & Pickle 1998). This served to create
major uncertainry for non-profit renewable projects, as they had no assurance that
they'll receive their payments from year to year, especially since as of 1996 Congress
has not appropriated enough funds to cover the claims of eligible projects (Wiser &
Pickle 1998). The Department of Energy tried to reduce some of the risk associated
with the projects by determining beforehand if a project is eligible for REPI, but they
cannot guarantee payment (Wiser & Pickle 1998).

Energy Policy Act of 2005
The Energy Policy Act of2005 was the first omnibus energy legislation
enacted since the 1992 Energy Policy Act (Holt & Glover 2006). This act features
many of the same standards for tax incentives for domestic energy production, with
about $4.5 billion for renewables, and $5.6 billion for oil, gas and coal (Holt &
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Glover 2006). It also repealed PURPA's purchase requirement for utilities from all
qualified facilities, if the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) determines
that a qualifying facility has adequate market access (Holt & Glover 2006).
The Act also addressed Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS) by requiring that
motor fuels contain at least 4.0 billion gallons of renewable fuel in 2006 and increase
by 700 million gallons each year through 20 II (Holt & Glover 2006). In 2004, about
3.5 billion gallons of ethanol was used in motor fuels, with the eventual goal being
7.5 billion gallons in 2012 (Holt & Glover 2006). The REPI payments were also
broadened allowing for more producers to become qualified facilities, but the funding
still remains subject to the same appropriations as before (Holt & Glover 2006).
Congress did, bowever, authorize making appropriations for REPI between 2006 and
2026 (Holt & Glover 2006).

Energy Independence alld Security Act of 2007
Following the Energy Policy Act of2005, Congress also enacted the Energy
Independence and Security Act of2007 (EISA). The law focuses on improving
energy efficiency and increasing the availability of renewable energies; however, the
biggest renewable provisions wcre excluded from the law (Sissine 2007). Tbe law
itself features a Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standard (CAFE), which requires
that cars and light trucks in fleets must have a fuel economy of at least 35 miles per
gallon by 2020 (Sissine 2007). The RFS from the Energy Policy Act of2005 was
modified to sct the standard at 9.0 billion gallons by 2008, and 31 billion gallons by
2022 (Sissine 2007).
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Two major provisions that never made it into the law were the repeal of $22
billion of oil and gas subsidies and a national Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard
(RPS) (Sissine 2007). The repeal of the subsidies was supposed to fund more
programs for renewable energy and energy efficiency, but it was stripped from the
bill in the Senate (Sissine 2007). The RPS was also stripped from the bill , as the
House proposed that a national RPS target of 15% should be set up and met by 2020
(Sissine 2007). RPS are quantity regimes where the government sets an amount of
renewable energies that must be achieved and leaves it up to the market to determine
price, working as an opposite to feed-in laws which set price and let the market
determine quantity (Wiistenhagen & Bilharz 2006).

Scate-Level RPS Standards
While a national RPS has not been set up, many states have taken the
initiative to do so. As of 2004, 13 states in the US have some form of RPS standard in
place, including states such as Texas, Iowa, Minnesota, Maine and Pennsylvania
(Wiser et. al. 2004). In terms of success the results of the RPS have been mixed, with
some states setting up highly successful RPS , while others have fallen short (Wiser
et.al. 2004).

Texas's RPS , in particular, has been very successful at driving the
development of new wind power capacity, with over 900MW installed in 2001
(Wiser et.al. 2004). Texas's policy has a target of 2000MW of additional renewables
by 2009, which amounts to about 2.5% of the state's electricity load, and has explicit
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penalties for non-compliance (Wiser et.al. 2004). The electricity produced averages
about an extra 3¢/kWh , which is passed on to the consumers (Wiser et.al. 2004).
Iowa's and Minnesota's policies have also been successful. Iowa required the
state utilities to purchase 105MW of renew ables , which the utilities complied with ,
although no new legislation to expand from the 105MW has been created (Wiser et.al.
2004). Minnesota required Xed, the large t utility in the state, to purchase 425MW of
wind and 125MW of biomass by 2002, with an additional purchase of 400MW by
2006, and made a statewide RPS goal of 10% by 2015 (Wiser et.a!' 2004). The
mandates for Xcel have resulted in new wind and biomass development, and the
utilities have been compliant in striving for the 10% goal (Wiser et.al. 2004).
By contrast, Maine and Pennsylvania are at tbe other end of the spectrum.
Their standards have failed to stimulate new renewable energy growth . Maine had a
very aggressive 30% RPS standard beginning in 2000, but due to the fact that the law
allowed existing renewables and a broad base of fossil fuel resources to count toward
RPS goal, it has ensured that no new renewable development would occur (Wiser
et.al. 2004). Pennsylvania faces a similar problem, as new and existing renewable
generation is eligible, but compounds it by applying a low standard to only a very
small subset of energy suppliers (Wiser et.al. 2004).

The other states that have RPS goals fall on the spectrum between Texas's
success and the structural failures of Maine and Pennsylvania (Wiser et.a!' 2004).
Lately, more states have been implementing their own RPS, with the total as of2009
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at 33 states (DOE: EERE 2009). It remains to be seen if more states will be as
successful as Texas or if they will follow Maine and Pennsylvania's examples.

VI. Conclusions
As mentioned earlier, Gern1any has been consistently meeting and exceeding
its goals regarding renewable energies while the United States has been reluctant to
even set goals on a nationwide scale. While some of Germany's success can be
attributed to luck as the laws were passed in a time where the conventional power
generators were distracted, most of the success is due to policy design (Wiistenhagen

& Bilharz 2006). The feed-in-tariffs opened the energy markets to new firms and then
allowed the technology to diffuse naturally (Wiistenhagen & Bilharz 2006). This
created a number of positive feedback loops which workcd to strengthen the position
of alternative energies in the system and allowed for the system to become selfsustaining (Jacobsson & Bergek 2004).

By comparison, the US's policies have fallen short of accomplishing this type
of marked increase in production. Whereas Gelmany's policies have actively
encouraged market entrance, the US's policies tricd to do the same thing, but were
generally unsuccessful. The US is also, however, very fragmented in its policy
creation and application, with many alternative energy policies being only
implemented at the state level. Each state is different, and has different norms and
attitudes surrounding things like altemative energies. This creates cultural and
institutional barriers that vary from state to state, fragmenting the policy landscape
even further.
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Importan ce of Policy Design
To design a successful alternative energy policy several things need to be kept
in mind: the systems that govern technologies are complex and feedback loops may
create unforeseen effects, the time frame involved is very long, and the political
struggle for institutional support will be intense (Jacobsson & Bergek 2004). This
necessitates providing new technologies with certainty when entering the market;
otherwise the risk for a finn ' s investment may be too great, and it will discourage
them instead.
The Gennans solved this by guaranteeing prices over a long period of time.
This gave finns the certainty they needed to make investing their money into the
system less risky. The US version of Gennany ' s strategy, however, did not create any
guarantees. By subjecting REPI to congressional appropriations, there is no way to
tell whether or not there will be enough money for the government to pay firms
(Wiser & Pickle 1998). This means that only the finns that can enter the market
without support can risk doing so. By precluding many of the small firms that may
wish to enter the market, the knowledge base suffers and not as many networks are
built. The lack of strong networks then prevents the gathering of political power that
could lead to a stronger lobbying force. The positive feedback loops that made
Gennany' s policy successful are therefore not achieved and the growth of alternative
energies isn ' t as strong as it could be.

This long-tenn certainty does not need to come from a price regime as it does
in Germany. Texas has already demonstrated that a quantity regime can create the
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market opportunities that are needed for finns to consider taking the risk on a nonincumbent teclmology. Texas created an RPS with a set date and created heavy
punishments for cases of non-compliance (Wi er et.a!. 2004). In this type of strategy,
it is the penalties and legislative certainty that are impOltant. Arizona, for example,
has an RPS but it is under review, creating uncertainty over eventual targets (Wiser
et.a!' 2004). The uncertainty coupled with a lack of enforcement has created a
situation of under-compliance. The utilities don ' t want to spend money on renewable
energies that may end up exceeding the eventual RPS target, and as there is no
punishment for their hesitation, very little progress is being made (Wiser et.al. 2004).
By creating a policy that is set for a number of years and enforced, this kind of
situation can be avoided.

The Way Forward
Uncertainty and a lack of enforcement prevent the market for renewable
energies from forming. To create effective alternative energy policy, the US has to
tackle those two factors. The creation of an effective policy will not be easy as the US
does not have the benefit of a distracted conventional energy lobby as Gennany did.
There docs, however, need to be some motion forward. The current energy system is
unsustainable and prices will inevitably rise as they did in the past. But if the US sets
appropriate policies in place, the effect of market forces and declining resources does
not need to be as devastating as it was in 1973.
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VII. Grundsatze de.· Erneuerba.·en Energie:
Ein Vergleich zwischen denVe.·einigten Staaten und Deutschland

Energie wird heute unter den allerwiehtigsten Fragen der Welt betraehtet. Der
Preis von Benzin und Hei zo l geht immer hoher, weil die Versorgung des Erdols
auslauft. Meistens suehen die Lander eine Losung zu der Energiekrise. Eine Losung
ist die Benutzung von mehr erneuerbaren oder alternativen Energien, wie
Solarenergie, Windenergie, oder Wasserlcraften. Dieser Aufsatz besprieht die
Energiepolitik der Vereinigten Staaten und Deutschland, und was sie voneinander
lernen konnen.

Alternative Energien sind die Energien, die keine fossilen Brennstoffe
benutzen . Fossile Brennstoffewerden heute haufig verwendel, weil sie vorher billig
und leieht verfiigbar waren, aber die Brennstoffe sind nieht ohne Probleme. Fossile
Brennstoffe sind nieht unbegrenzt und mit dem globalen Populationswaehtstulll
werden sie nicht ausreiehen, um den Energiebedarf zu deeken. Fossile Brennstoffe
produzieren auch Kohlendioxid , das zum Klimawandel beitragt. Alternative Energien
haben weniger Problellle, als die fossilen Brennstoffe.

Alternative Energien sind erneuerbar, und werden nicht auslaufen, wie die
fossilen Brennstoffe. Diese Energien konnen die Anforderungen einer gro/3eren
Weltbevolkerung befriedigen. Da sind fiinfversehiedene Typen von Alternativen
Energien: Solar, Wind, Wasser, Biolllasse, und Erdwarme. Die verschiedenen Typen
von Energie sind aile an verschiedenen Punkten in ihrer Marktentwicklung, wobei
einige billiger als andere sind. Zum Beispiel, Wind kann mit fossilen Brennstoffen
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konkurrieren , wahrend Solar teurer iSl, und Hi I fe von der Regierung braucht, zu
konkurrieren .

Die Wirksamkeit einer Politik kann dadurch gem essen werden, wie effektiv
diese Politik ist, insofern eine Technologie innerhalb eines Marktes bewegt. Es gibt
drei wesentliche Teile, aus denen das System der Technologie verstanden werden soli:
die Unternehmen, die Netzwerke und die Institutionen. Die Unternehmen machcn und
verkaufen die Technologie, wiihrend die Netzwerke Kenntnisse zwischen den
Unternehmen tibel1ragen. lnstitutioncn schlie13en die Regierung und die Kultur ein
und korUlen die Technologie entweder helfen oder behindern. Gemeinsam konnen die
Wechselwirkungen der drei Teile zeigen , wie eine Tcchnik im allgemeinen verwendet
wird. Wenn die Gesetze von der Regierung wirksam sind, bringen sie mehr
Unternehmen hinein und schaffen mehr Netzwerke, die dann Lobbys schaffen konnen,
die die Regierung flir mehr Gesetze ermutigen, ihnen zu helfen. Wenn die Gesetze
nicht wirksam sind , dann treten die Unternehmen nicht in den Markt ein, und die
Technologie wachst nicht in der Popularitat.

Die Regierungen in Deutschland und in den Vereinigten Staaten haben
Gesetze gemacht, die Alternative Energie zu konkurrieren helfen sollen. Deutschland
hat sein erstes gro13es Gesetz fur Alternative Energien im Jahr 1991 erlassen. Das
Stromeinspeisungsgesetz (StrEG) war ein Einspeisentarif, der ursprtinglich fiir
Wasserkriifte gemacht worden war. Es hat den I-Ierstellern von alternativen Energien
den Zugang zum Stromnetz gegeben und subventionierte Stromerzeugung fur die
alternativen Energien. Die Subvention aus alternativen Energien macht die Energien
wettbewerbsHihiger mit konventioneller Energie, und so sind mehr Unternehmen in
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den Markt eingetreten. Das StrEG war sehr wirksam und hat eine grof3e Wind
energieindustrie erzeugt. Die Windindustrie betrieb dann lobbying flir die Schaffung
eines neuen altemativen Energien-Gesetz, das einige der Probleme, die die StrEG
hatte, beheben wiirde. Dieses neue Gesetz war das Emeuerbare Energie Gesetz
(EEG), das im Jahr 2000 erlassen wurde. Es hat genaue Preise flir altemative Energie
Subventionen aufgestellt, die Prozentangaben angelegt und brei tete die Last der
Subventionen iiber das ganze Land. Das EEG regelt auch den Netzzugang und
garantiert den Preis flir 20 Jahre, und das hat eine noch bessere Markt Gelegenheit flir
Untemehmen in dem Markt geschaffen.

Die Gesetze der Vereinigten Staaten waren weniger erfolgreich. Die
Vereinigten Staaten haben vor allem auf Steuererleichterungen als ihr wichtigstes
Mittel zur Forderung altemativer Energie~ verlassen. 1m Jahr 1978 haben die US eine
Steuergutschrift flir lnvestitionen geschaffen, urn den Bau von altemativen
Energieanlagen zu fOrdem. Diese Steuergutschrift hatte keinen Anreiz, urn die
Anlageeffizienter zu machen oder fur die Anlage mehr Energie zu produzieren, und
so war die Anlage nicht benuzt. Urn dies zu korrigieren wurde 1992 eine Produktion
Steuergutschrift (PTC) gegriindet. Die Produktion Steuergutschrift gab der Anlage
einen Anreiz, Energie zu produzieren. 1m Jahre 1992 hatte auch die USA einen
Anreiz flir die Produktion emeuerbarer Energien (REPl) flir gemeinniitzige
Organisationen gesehafft, weil die gemeinniitzigen Organisationen Steuergutschriften
nicht benutzen durften. Die Wirksamkeit des PTe war jedoch begrenzt, da viele der
Untemehmen, die den Anspruch hatten nehmen diirfen, ihn unter die eingestellte
Minimum Steuer (AMT) fallen liessen. Das AMT ist weniger giinstig als die nonnale
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Steuerschuld berechnet, und wenn es hoher als die normale Steuer ist, miissen die
Unternehmen die AMT zahlen. Man kann Steuergutschriften nicht fur die AMT
verwenden. Das bedeutet, dass die Unternehmen , die unter das AMT gefallen sind,
die Stcucrgutschriftcn nicht benutzen durften und so sind weniger Firmcn auf den
Markt eingetreten. Die REPI hatte auch seine eigenen Probleme. Der Kongress muss
das Geld fur REPI vClwenden , etwas, was oft nicht passiertc. REPI war seit 1996
unterfinanziert, und so war es kein Anreiz fur die Unternehmen in den Markt
ei nzu treten.

Einige der Staaten in den USA haben mehr Erfolg bei Erstellen von
Richtlinien , um aitelllative Energien zu fdrdclll. Erneuerbare Energie POItfolio
Standards (RPS) in den Staaten setzen eine Energiemenge, die aus alternativen
Energiequellen in einem Staat produziert wird. Abhiingig von dem Aufbau der RPS,
kann ein RPS Gesetz wirksam Markt Gelegenheit fur alternative Energien schaffen .

In Texas, wo der RPS hoch eingestellt ist, und die Strafen fur die Nichteinhaltung der
Norm steil sind, sind die Encrgie-Untelllehmcn schnell nachzukommen. In Arizona
sind die Standards nicht dllrchgesetzt lind die Gesetzgebung steht standig zur
Diskussion, so sind Energie-Untelllehmen da nicht gewachsen.

Eine Politik ist am effektivsten, wenn sie mehrere Unternehmen in die
Investition in eine Tcchnologie bringcn. Dic Politik muss die Gefahr, die in dcm
Markt findet, redllzieren, weil das mehr Unternehmen in den Markt bringen wird. Es
ist der dcutschen Politik gelungen, das zu tun, indem sie cinen festcn Preis und cincn
stabilen Markt geschaffen hat, und so sind viele Firmen in den Markt gekommen.
Diese erfolgreiche Politik liess die Geschiiftszweige wachsen lind machte
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Deutschland zu einem Land der weltweit fuhrenden alternativen Energie
Technologien. Die Politik in den USA war nicht so erfolgreich , weil viele der Firnlen
die Anreize nicht benutzen dUrfen. Dies bedeutet, dass nicht so viele Firmen in den
USA in den Markt eingetreten sind, so dass die Industrie in den USA nicht so stark
als in Deutschland is!. In den USA liegt die Hoffnung nir alternative Energien bei den
Staaten, von denen einige erfolgreich beim Ball ihrer alternativen Energiewirtschaft
gewesen sind. Um mehr Erfolg zu haben , mUssen die USA eine Politik schaffen, die
mehr Anreize bieten, fur Unternehmen in den Markt einzutreten. Dann, vielleicht
wiirden die USA den gleichen Erfolg mit alternativen Energien wie Deutschland
erfahren.
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